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1. INTRODUCTION 
In one of the best-regarded books about the subject, Jan Aart Scholte intimates that our established 
ways of organizing social scientific knowledge are deeply sub-optimal for the effective study of 
globalization:   
 
Most professional research continues to be funnelled through discipline-related organs. 
Similarly, most academic conferences have remained tribal conclaves on disciplinary lines. 
Most academic funding has continued to flow through disciplinary channels, and respect of 
disciplinarity normally still provides researchers with a faster track to promotion than 
alternative approaches. In short, some minor inroads aside, disciplinary methodology 
remains quite firmly entrenched in the contemporary globalizing world (Scholte, 2000: 
198).  
 
In his review of the same book, James Rosenau (2001) engages in a speculative lament that 
Scholte’s Globalization: a Critical Introduction will only find its way onto reading lists for 
political science and International Relations courses. The inherent irony alluded to here by Rosenau 
is that a book which has so much to say about phenomena that are post/supra territorial in character 
is mediated by a fundamentally territorial epistemological politics.  Underwriting this dilemma is a 
well-worn argument from the sociology of knowledge. Disciplinarity, if is about anything, is about 
imposing boundaries around the business of knowledge production in modern academe. Academic 
conversations are, by and large, introverted and self-referential affairs. Members of disciplinary 
communities are subject to various disciplining norms that socialize them, grant them permissions, 
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create incentives for them and impose constraints upon them that together help to define both the 
academically acceptable and the academically possible in a given field (Klein, 1996).  
 
There are, of course, strong and well-rehearsed defences of the disciplinary status quo that date 
back at least as far as Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim, 1982), which 
posited a clear rationale for discrete academic communities, each with distinct objects of analysis. 
Other pro-disciplinary arguments vary from the seductive claim that disciplinarity carries with it a 
legitimation function that allows scholars to carry on their work without intervention or censure 
from external authorities to the hard core Kuhnian argument that knowledge cannot progress 
without being organised by cohesive and closed communities where fundamental assumptions are 
shared and dissidence is marginalized. .  
 
The appearance of the concept of globalization as a defining motif in the social sciences provokes 
all manner of thoughts about the limitations of our bounded, territorial academic universe. Different 
types of argument might be mobilised here. Perhaps the most obvious is that what we label 
‘globalization’ is multidimensional in character (Bernstein, 1991). While most ‘common sense’ 
understandings of the term treat it as a phenomenon associated with transformations in the 
economy, the voluminous literature across many disciplines suggests that we are dealing with a set 
of processes that inhabit, cut across and affect numerous domains of human action. Disciplines – by 
definition – deal with bounded domains such as ‘economy’, ‘polity’ and ‘society’. They impose 
boundaries on their respective objects of study and, therefore, arguably contribute to the reification 
of these objects though their ongoing disciplinary practices (Amin and Palan, 2001: 566). For 
example, the ongoing practice of economics (the discipline) deals with an assumed object – the  
economy – that operates as a closed system. The idea of globalization seems to presuppose a 
transcendence of objective or imagined boundaries in human life because of growing 
interconnectedness. The point here is not simply that bounded notions of territorial geography lose 
meaning, but also all bounded action ceases to be explicable in its own terms. It follows that a 
reconfiguration of academic boundaries is urgent because our extant academic universe is 
congenitally incapable of dealing with globalization (Smith, 1998). Moreover, as we organize 
knowledge into bounded domains, so we also presuppose or at least hypothesize the existence of 
relationships between them, so that – for example - changes in the economy might impact upon the 
polity. In international studies there is an acute variation of this tendency where the very category 
‘inter-national’ conjures up not only imagery of the shaping actors within that domain (states), but 
also reifies the boundaries between the international and the domestic. In hard-core versions of 
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(neo)realist International Relations, we find perhaps the most aggressive attempt to normalise these 
images of the ontology of world politics into mainstream disciplinary practice. And yet, if even 
some of the softer claims about globalization are to be believed, then – for reasons that are well 
rehearsed – this particular line of academic discourse is phenomenally anachronistic.  
 
So discomfort with disciplinarity is not simply about the failure to embrace Rosenau’s entreaty that   
‘to study globalization, in short, is perforce to undertake interdisciplinary inquiry, so far-reaching 
and interrelated are its ramifications’ (Rosenau, 2001: 115; see also Vickers, 2003). This line of 
argument runs a little deeper than arguing for the creation of spaces – research institutes, journals, 
professional associations and so on – that enable productive and enlightening discussion amongst 
practitioners of various disciplines with an interest in globalization. It is nothing less than an 
invitation to think about the pathological constraints that disciplinarity imposes upon the 
development of knowledge about globalization and its consequences. Aside from reifying their 
objects, runs this line of thinking, disciplines have a habit of reifying themselves to the extent that 
their internal criteria for the judgement of rigour and excellence became dynamic contributors to 
their reproduction regardless of whether or how their objects of study are changing. Part of this 
process, as Arjun Appadurai has argued recently, is a reliance on ‘data sets, methodologies, models 
and techniques’ that have built into themselves ‘the implicit architecture of the nation-state’ (Social 
Science Research Council, 2003: 26).  
 
There is an immediate and pertinent objection to this line of thinking. The move to eradicate or 
transcend disciplinarity makes the apparent assumption that the world is globalized or, at the very 
least, is globalizing. But what if scholars doubt the authenticity of the ‘globalization hypothesis’? 
The issue then becomes one of whether our present disciplinary arrangements allow for effective 
refutation and critical rebuttal of truth claims that are made around the idea of globalization. 
Arguments about the need to re-think how we acquire knowledge about or in the context of 
globalization tend to presuppose a climate of transformation rather than stasis. The assumption of 
most doubters seems to be that solid, rigorous work using the established tools, axioms and norms 
of political science, economics and economic history (to name but three fields where such work is 
especially evident) is capable of showing clearly how claims about globalization – as either a 
structural condition or a set of effects – amount to mythology or hyperbole. Sociologists of 
knowledge and disciplinary historians often remind us of how the evolution of (a) forms of 
academic knowledge and (b) the evolution of modernity are co-constitutive. It follows, therefore, 
that an incautious rush to formulate a ‘global(ization) studies’ that presumes a priori that its object 
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is globalized may fall into the trap of contributing to the constitution of that globalized reality. Put 
simply, the very practice of describing a world without borders where power shifts markedly from 
the public to the private domains, where the authority and autonomy of the state is reduced and 
where policy possibilities are heavily circumscribed is likely to accelerate the achievement of very 
reality. This is of particular importance to those scholars of globalization who choose to study this 
object out of critical motivations and a desire to contribute to the initiation of a more just, equitable, 
democratic and redistributive world order than presently prevails (Rosow, 2003). It could be argued 
that the most effective strategy for retaining such possibilities might, paradoxically, be to do in 
what much of the political science of globalization already does: engage with the common sense 
understandings of economic or hyper-globalization and produce results that qualify or refute the 
claims that are routinely made  (Rosamond, 2003). 
 
Consequently, those who feel uncomfortable discipline-based discussions of globalization need to 
find more powerful arguments in favour of overturning epistemological certainties. Each of the 
books discussed here can be read as representative of one possible reaction to the questions laid out 
above. But it is worth stressing from the outset that these volumes are written for different purposes 
and different audiences. Each emerges from a distinctive intellectual location and two of the 
authors (Bauman and Sørensen) are notable for thinking about what we might call ‘epistemological 
politics’ that are internal to disciplines (sociology and political science/IR respectively) rather than 
offering full-blown inter- or post-disciplinary manifestos as such. The third volume by Cameron 
and Palan brings together scholars from different disciplinary locations (geography and political 
science/IR respectively) without explicitly announcing itself as an interdisciplinary project. The 
product is perhaps more a testament to what might emerge from the types of academic geography 
and political science each practices. 
 
2. PUTTING GLOBALIZATION IN ITS PLACE 
The first response, represented by Sørensen’s The Transformation of the State, acknowledges that 
globalization is a multi-faceted and multi-scalar process. As a result, the totality of globalization 
studies amounts to much more than any single contribution can manage. Isolated studies should 
make an analytical choice to focus upon a particular aspect of globalization. Thus Sørensen states 
explicitly that his strategy is to focus on economic globalization (p.25). This is, of course, a choice 
that positions scholars in a ‘best of both worlds’ scenario. We are not required to engage in the 
destructive business of revolutionizing our established (disciplinary) mode of knowledge 
production. But as Sørensen implies (although never explicitly states) throughout his work, 
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disciplines must be open rather than autarchic in their approach to the world. Plus their practitioners 
must be cognisant of their limitations and the inevitability of only partial explanation. Sørensen’s 
book is, therefore, nicely positioned to take account of potential transformative changes wrought by 
globalization, but retains a residual corrective scepticism. This in turn allows for the deployment of 
standard modes of investigation as correctives to over-zealous assertions about how states are 
marginalized or residualized by the forces of global capitalism.     
 
One variation of this type of response carries with it rather more wide-ranging implications.  
Scholte (2000; 2002) observes that much work that purports to be about globalization is actually 
concerned with other (analytically distinct) things. The ensuing strategy requires the definitional 
separation of ‘globalization’ from the likes of ‘internationalization’, ‘liberalization’ and 
‘Americanization’ and the subsequent cordoning off of globalization studies to deal with 
phenomena that are manifestly transcendent of territoriality. Scholte’s strategy is countered by 
those with alternative definitions of globalization (for example Brenner, 1999), but his contribution 
is not simply about the quest for conceptual precision. Rather Scholte identifies a common 
intellectual pathology in the social sciences – which he labels ‘methodological territorialism’ – 
whose practice reinforces a tendency to reify boundaries between distinct spheres, spaces or levels 
of human action (2002: 27). In other words, territorialist method dominates social scientific norms 
and induces ‘intellectual habits [that] are so engrained that most social researchers reproduce them 
more or less unconsciously’ (2002: 23). We might speculate that territorialist pathologies are 
themselves a function of disciplinarity. Thus the habits of, say, political science and International 
Relations become resistant to conceptions of globalization that dissolve well-used heuristic devices 
which allow scholars to hypothesise relationships between analytically separable scales/levels of 
human action (see also Rosamond, 2005). This provokes a rather more profound critique of the 
‘traditionalist’ objection raised above. It suggests an in-built tendency to produce results about 
globalization that are sceptical a priori of any transformationalist claims.  
 
An explanation for this tendency is provided in Stephen Rosow’s recent essay on the possibilities 
for a critical interdisciplinary global studies (Rosow, 2003). Rosow notes that scholars drawn away 
from the mainstream toward the study of global phenomena regard uncertainty and contingency as 
defining features of the present and this in turn necessitates a retreat from those characteristics of 
supposedly ‘good’ social science (parsimony, objectivity, replicability, the 
exogenous/epiphenomenal status of language and so on) that lead us to tell stories about an ordered, 
bounded world. In contrast ‘[g]lobal studies promotes studies as well as forms of scholarly 
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communication rooted in interpretive and critical methodologies that value plurality of methods and 
rules of enquiry and do not seek a unity of knowledge’ (Rosow, 2003: 5).   
 
This is far beyond the scope of Sørensen’s book, but a pertinent question is how such insights, 
tendencies and intellectual movements are (a) authorized to the extent that they acquire legitimacy 
in the context of the university and (b) communicated to students, construed as both clients of 
regimes of knowledge production and potential agents of their reproduction. The question is 
relevant because of the three books reviewed, Sørensen’s is the most explicitly designed for 
textbook use and a student readership. In this case the clientele is students of International 
Relations (IR), the discipline, as Rosow notes (2003: 3-6), most obviously authorized to generate 
valid knowledge about politics beyond the frontiers of the national.  
 
The viability of the state is a major theme in globalization discourse and the status of the state is 
central to understanding alternative versions of the project of IR. Thus Sørensen’s take on the 
globalization debate is to focus on analytical claims about what economic globalization is doing to 
the state. In this enterprise, he is far from alone (see, for example, Clark, 1999; Goldmann, 2001; 
Palan, 2000; Panitch, 1994; Smith, Solinger and Topik, 1999). The Transformation of the State is 
subtitled ‘beyond the myth of retreat’ (emphasis added), and part of what Sørensen strives for is the 
identification of a kind of nuanced analytical ‘third way’ that is wholly sceptical of two stylised – 
but often heard – hypotheses about the state in the context of economic globalization. Put simply, 
these are the ‘state-centric’, ‘business as usual’ version of statehood that rejects the usual portfolio 
of claims made on behalf of globalization and the ‘retreat’ view that tends to be very supportive of 
the very same assertions. Sørensen articulates his critique with forensic skill and positions himself 
with wonderful clarity as a proponent of a ‘transformationalist’ alternative. Here, to put it starkly, 
the state continues to matter in spite of economic globalization. Yet the way it matters and how it is 
configured in the context of globalization is changeable and variable across time and space.  
 
But never far from the surface are a series of disciplinary issues. Most obviously, Sørensen writes 
from a position that is entirely conscious of the ways in which theoretical starting points induce 
particular types of analytical strategies and thus foreclose the possibility of certain conclusions 
being reached. He is particularly good at asking awkward yet fundamentally useful questions about 
the pathologies embedded within the realist and liberal traditions in IR. For example, in his 
discussions of realism, Sørensen acknowledges that this tradition of enquiry is built around certain 
stylized axiomatic principles, which – in turn – are designed to facilitate particular kinds of often 
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valuable ‘what if?’ thought experiments about the international system. His point, however, is that 
realism fails categorically to speak to the debate about the state: 
 
[I]f realists want to make serious contribution (sic) to the debate about what happens to the 
state, it is necessary to modify some of their core assumptions. If they do not, they will 
remain painted into a corner where the realist state-centric position is always vindicated, 
irrespective of what happens in the real world, because the unassailable power of the state is 
built into the realist assumptions about the world. This reduces the realist state-centric view 
to a mere matter of faith and the debate with retreat scholars is turned into a ‘religious’ 
shouting competition instead of an analytical endeavour to find out what is actually 
happening (p.181, emphasis added).  
 
To transform itself into this analytical endeavour, Sørensen recommends that realism follows his 
analysis and relax its core assumptions by both recognizing the multi-actor character of the global 
polity and unpacking the state from within. Of course, this would do fatal violence to IR realism as 
an intellectual project. Without its well-rehearsed core assumptions realism, in effect, ceases to be 
realism. But why make this detour to expose the incapacity of one tradition within IR to engage in a 
conversation about something that historically it has not been interested in? In so far as there still is 
an inter-state system, then why not allow realists to carry on regardless with modelling its dynamics 
and simply broaden the remit of IR to embrace approaches that express an interest in other aspects 
of world politics? The answer – and Sørensen seems acutely aware of this, even if he does not fully 
explore its implications – is that IR as a field has been governed by a series of dominant 
conversations whose introversion prevents scholars from speaking meaningfully to a transformed 
reality. Moreover, it narrates its own history is terms of a series of debates (between realism and 
idealism, between traditionalists and behaviouralists and between a realist mainstream and a 
plurality of alternative voices) that, once retold, help to reinforce the core state-centric, ‘hard 
security’ ontology of the field’s (supposedly) legitimate domain (Schmidt, 1998; 2002; Smith, 
1995).  
 
From the closing passages of the book, it is clear that Sørensen endorses a social science where 
there are clear follow-throughs from ‘analysis’ to ‘action’ (p.193). The persistence of stylized and 
anachronistic assumptions – and here varieties of liberal IR are equally as culpable as their realist 
counterpart – is a major block to the achievement of such normative purpose. Engaging in a 
productive conversation with and about transformed realities is dependent on the practice of 
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keeping starting assumptions open (p.7) rather than performing the self-fulfilling axiomatic 
closures so characteristic of the main schools of IR. Sørensen makes two further arguments, which 
seem particularly important to his project. First, we are, throughout the volume, reminded of the 
good examples to IR provided by International Political Economy (IPE) and historical sociology. 
The clear implication is that the study of states and the states system needs to venture somewhat 
beyond the safety of its home (IR) domain. Second, Sørensen wants to remind IR of its organic 
connections to political science and history. By revisiting the classic conundrums of political 
science and political theory, we are forced to default to a rather more restless analytical position 
than is commonplace in IR. The most rudimentary questions about democracy – who are the 
people, how should the people rule, what should be the extent of popular rule? (p. 187) – 
necessitate an engagement with the degree to which the contexts of politics are undergoing 
alteration. Meanwhile, a reminder that IR’s cherished categories – ‘the state’, ‘the states system’ 
and so on – are historicized categories rather than timeless constants actually pulls the carpet from 
beneath much of what passes for contemporary IR scholarship (pp. 7-14, 189-190).   
 
Sorensen’s book is not an exercise in the sociology of knowledge, but his depiction of the orthodox 
terms of engagement in IR debates about the state is a useful reminder to scholars and a crucial 
observation for students that the liberal-realist exchange is rooted in conditions of disciplinary 
foundation (on which see MacLean, 2000; Schmidt, 1998, 2002; Smith, 2004). His conclusion, 
which he shares with many others, is that the classical IR traditions – realism and liberalism – are 
‘predestined’ to ask inappropriate questions about the contemporary state, thereby underscoring the 
point that our modes of knowledge production are not straightforwardly responsive to our object. 
But the argument can be taken much further, and it is by the other two volumes considered here.    
 
3. REINVENTING SOCIOLOGY 
This all connects to a second argument, that is best expressed by Bauman, not only in the opening 
passages of Society Under Siege, but also in some of his earlier work (for example, Bauman, 1992). 
In short, this position claims that the social sciences as we know them are deeply co-constitutive of 
modernity in the form of the territorial nation-state. The patient in Bauman’s diagnostic cubicle is 
the discipline of sociology, which he describes as ‘the intelligence branch of [the sovereign state’s] 
… practice’ (p.2). As noted by Cameron and Palan (p.12), Bauman (1992) draws a link between the 
ascendancy of the nation-state and the rise of calculative rationality (on the implications for 
contemporary conceptions of territory see Elden, 2005). The story of twentieth century social 
science then might be read as an ongoing intellectual project designed to demystify social 
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complexity by searching persistently for regularities, routines and predictable patterns. This 
resonates with the arguments above about social scientific pathologies in that this macro-scholarly 
project begets not only a methodological orientation that hypothesizes linear causal relationships – 
often between conceptually distinct domains (for example globalization impacts upon national state 
capacities or changes in the economy induce effects in the polity) – but also a tendency to reify and 
reproduce particular conceptions of social reality. As Bauman puts it: ‘[b]ent on cracking the 
mystery of the “social reality effect”, sociologists could not help but discover the 
sovereign/legitimate power of the state as both its necessary and sufficient condition’ (p.6). 
 
The shadow cast by post-Comtian positivism provokes two further observations. First is the 
relatively simple idea that the founding social context of approaches seeking to reveal ‘social 
statics’ is potentially very different from the conditions of today (Smith, 1998: 81). So we might 
think about the dominant forms of modern social science as path dependent progeny of intellectual 
choices made in the late nineteenth century in a very different context, albeit a context in which the 
nation-state form was solidifying as the dominant mode of organizing politics. The second is more 
central to Bauman’s book. This has rather more to do with the relationship between subject and 
object in sociological enquiry and the presumption of detachment from the object to which 
‘modern’ social science aspires. In a characteristically acute passage, Bauman describes much of 
contemporary sociology as inhabiting a ‘“zombie” posthumous phase’ and suffering from a 
condition dubbed ‘apoplexia philosophica’ (p.37). He argues that the project of analytical 
detachment needs urgent replacement by a move toward ‘grammatical thinking’, where the 
intellectual enterprise is reoriented towards productive conversations with and on behalf of social 
subjects.  
 
Bauman identifies two ways in which his discipline can (re)acquire importance in the face of the 
enormous social transformations of our time that much of the book is devoted to describing. In the 
first place, sociology needs to remember that one of its tasks is to provide a constant reminder that 
the world is made and unmade by human agency (p.22). Abdication from this task, Bauman insists, 
will only reinforce the widespread pessimism that attends public discourses of globalisation, where 
the latter is deemed to be an ineluctable, imperative-setting set of exogenous processes that 
dramatically impair the possibilities for positive human agency. As he notes in a passage that will 
resonate with many that have sought to grapple critically with the rhetoric of globalization, 
‘weakness of agency tends to be self-perpetuating and self-exacerbating and arguably the greatest 
challenge that confronts sociology at the threshold of the twenty-first century’ (p.50). Bauman is 
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not alone in drawing such conclusions about the fatality of commonplace discourses of 
globalisation (see, for example Hay 2002), but he is perhaps more explicit than anyone else in 
pushing arguments about the complicity of normal social science in embedding such discourses and 
thereby inducing an atmosphere of pessimistic agency. To this is added sociology’s second task: 
the continuing assertion of human diversity, thereby not only reaffirming the ethical dream of 
sociology’s normative project, but now also cast as a necessary condition for human survival 
(p.22). 
 
So, we are confronted with a perplexing conundrum. On the one hand sociology is deeply 
implicated in a form of modernity that not only actively sponsors the casting of social science as a 
profession of rationalist technicians, but also ruthlessly detaches human beings from engagement 
with the possibility of their emancipation. On the other, there seems to be no necessary 
ambivalence about sociology’s project. Indeed, within the discipline’s DNA resides a code that in 
fact is essential to overcoming the dehumanizing and negative aspects of globalization. Bauman’s –  
largely implied – critique of sociology (even in its emancipatory form) is that it continues to fix its 
attentions on an object called ‘society’ (or at least upon a particular conception of society) that is 
fatally bound up with modernity’s ‘sendentary imagination’ (pp. 223-228), where power is 
associated with territoriality and progressive solutions are fundamentally place-bound. The problem 
is summed up neatly by Craig Calhoun, also writing about the predicament of sociology: 
 
disciplines are a great deal like nations, not least in their commitment to defending their turf 
and boundaries, but also in promulgating myths about their essential internal unity and 
character and literally disciplining the individualistic and dissentient opinions and behaviors 
of their members (Calhoun, 2002: 2). 
 
Bauman’s message, most forthrightly presented in his concluding chapter, seems to be that radical, 
utopian projects of the past proffered alternatives that sought to solidify the human condition via 
the application of reason – a central, but specific, accompaniment of place-bound modernity. The 
surpassing of the state by transnational capital and the dominance of neoliberal discourse has not 
only rendered power ‘placeless’, but has also (a) ensured the redundancy of utopian practice and (b) 
engineered widespread cynicism with the normative category ‘society’: 
 
This devaluation of territorial engagement and resentment of all finality is manifested in the 
new mistrust of ‘society’ and the exasperation caused by all suggestions of society-bound, 
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society-promoted and society-managed solutions to jointly or individually experienced 
human problems (p. 236) 
  
His point is that the practice of using (social scientific) reason to imagine better futures needs to be 
discontinued in favour of the presentation of alternative presents to ensure engagement with the 
‘privatized imagination’ that is characteristic of ‘liquid modernity’ (pp. 236-241). The crisis of 
present sociology is summed up in terms of what Bauman calls a ‘double bind’: ‘it [sociology] lost 
its natural(ized) object [society] together with its self evident client [the territorial nation-state]’ 
(p.11). 
 
Habitual readers of Bauman will be familiar with this sort of argument (see, for example, Bauman, 
1998). His diagnosis of modernity is not unique amongst sociologists and practitioners of allied 
trades and his extreme depiction of placeless social relations and deterritorialized power renders 
him vulnerable to some rather obvious critiques from more cautious scholars. Much of Bauman’s 
book is a sophisticated description of our transformed condition. Globalization is construed as a 
space of flows that is attended by a new multi-dimensional ‘life politics’. This together with novel 
associated technologies of domination produce the relatively straightforward and familiar argument 
that actually existing response mechanisms – be they ethical, political, economic – are spatially 
bounded by the continued compelling structures and narratives of the nation-state. It follows that 
‘an effective response to globalization can only be global. And the fate of such a global response 
depends on the emergence and entrenchment of a global (as distinct from ‘international’, or more to 
the point interstate) political arena’ (p.19). Moreover, while he clearly regards rationalist social 
science as a co-conspirator in the construction of ordered, place-bounded modernity and (by 
extension) the consolidation of its structures of power, Bauman’s critique of present intellectual 
projects is rather more centred on their failure to engage appropriately with what the blurb on the 
back jacket calls the ‘profound transformation of social life’. Perhaps this is because they are 
locked into a rationalist tradition that theorises and explains an order that no longer prevails. In so 
doing they close off critical and emancipatory possibilities. As indicated above, calls for 
multi/inter/trans/post-disciplinary social science have often been provoked by observations that the 
world ‘out there’ is changing. Bauman might (probably erroneously) be read as falling into this 
camp, whereas others would want to emphasise the long-standing and rich traditions of non-
rationalist scholarship which induces forms of social enquiry that break away from the 
mainstream’s pathological obsession with linearity, order and causality (Amin and Palan, 2001; 
Jessop and Sum, 2001).    
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4. TELLING STORIES ABOUT GLOBALIZATION 
It is from this non-rationalist starting point that the third argument departs. If nothing else, the 
incessant background chatter from politicians, policy officials, journalists, corporate actors and 
various public intellectuals about the ubiquity of globalization has prompted (some) scholars to 
revisit questions about the quality and utility of extant modes of disciplinary organization. Also 
under scrutiny are the ontological and epistemological building blocks of those arrangements. A 
related effect has been the increased attention paid to the significance of that very chatter. The 
object of enquiry from this starting point is less the idea of globalization as a process or condition 
with some sort of objective ‘out there’ quality, but rather the language and discourse of 
globalization as a shaper of perceptions, assumptions, actions and – perhaps – reality itself. The 
past few years have seen numerous discussions along these lines, but until now we have lacked a 
book-length treatment of globalization discourse. It is fortunate indeed that the first cab off the rank 
is Cameron and Palan’s truly outstanding volume. This is not simply the best, sustained discussion 
of the narrative and subjective qualities of globalization; it is actually amongst the most important 
books yet written on globalization.  
 
From the outset Cameron and Palan problematize the type of social scientific reasoning that would 
seek to reveal ‘truthful’ knowledge about globalization. The inseparability of theory from the world 
it seeks to describe recasts social scientific endeavour as a form of story-telling. The refutationist 
wing of globalization studies may have identified the mythological qualities of much rhetoric about 
globalization, but at the same time it has been remarkably unsuccessful at halting or even 
qualifying the extensive deployment of claims about globalization amongst policy, journalistic and 
corporate communities. This is because myths about globalization are not myths about reality; the 
myths are elemental to that reality (p.7). That they are constitutive of a reality where territoriality is 
presumed and where the fixed category of ‘the state’ is threatened in one way or another by the 
external, ‘global’ forces is the product of ‘considerable social energy’ (p.45). Cameron and Palan 
advance a series of ontological claims about a world of ongoing symbolic transaction. Thus they 
very carefully examine the ways in which future-oriented pronouncements about globalization 
emerge from a variety of corporate and policy sources. Urging strategic and programmatic 
preparation for anticipated futures is a routine pattern within such discourse. As such the (largely 
unspecified) idea of ‘globalization’ becomes a powerful framing device in discursively constructing 
the boundaries of the analytically and normatively possible.  
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 However, what Cameron and Palan then do – and here they add enormously to the literature on 
globalization discourse – is to show how these acts of framing are bound up intimately with the 
social scientific imagination. Indeed, within the academy and within social scientific orthodoxy in 
particular, we are habitual ‘framers’ following – as we still tend to – a quasi-Newtonian conception 
of time and space. The net effect is that academic discussions about globalization habitually mimic 
the logic of policy discourses in that the boundaries of ‘proper’ debate are normalized and positions 
within that debate are clearly delineated. In this way a conventional logic of territorialism is 
imposed upon academic argument, where ‘globalization’ occupies a spatial domain that is 
exogenous to the state. This both facilitates the treatment of globalization as a variable for which 
measurable proxies must be found and heightens the urgent search for hypothesized causal 
relationships between globalization and the (nation) state to be investigated. Moreover, social 
science and conventional historiography invests in a sequential/chronological conception of time, 
which again is shared with the cadences of policy discourse. Thus, in academic terms, the 
‘globalization debate’ becomes a discussion of how new (at least) transformative processes are 
undermining the past integrity of the national economy and the contiguity between the nation-state 
and its traditional economic jurisdiction. With this in mind Sørensen’s book is a prime example of 
an academic investigation of the veracity of this type of claim. Indeed, Sørensen’s interest does not 
extend to an investigating the plausibility of claims about established national economies (see 
especially, pp. 26-31). Yet the logic of Cameron and Palan’s analysis is to suggest that the ‘national 
economy’ of the past is as much a product of ongoing acts of narration as the hypothesized global 
economy of the present/future, underwritten as it was by forms of social scientific endeavour that 
simultaneously theorized and endorsed its existence.      
 
There are two obvious implications of the foregoing. The first is the way in which the globalization 
literature has become entrapped ‘within parameters set by our common understanding of what the 
nation-state has been in the past, is now, and ought to be in the future’ (p.54, see also Ruggie, 1998: 
172-197). The second implication is the problem that follows from the incapacity of social science 
to capture ‘globalization’ via its positivist inclinations that demand layers of analytical separation: 
‘[o]ften, it seems, the globalization debate has become lost in its own rhetoric and, because it does 
not see rhetoric as constitutive of the “real”, cannot find its way out’ (p. 69). Furthermore, there is a 
recursive and co-constitutive relationship between conventional academic work on globalization 
and the policy discourses with which much of that research seeks to engage: ‘could we have 
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thought about globalization or social exclusion, let alone institutionalise them in theory and 
practice, without the century or so old world of the social sciences?’ (p.65).  
 
Armed with a theory of the mechanisms through which the discursive space of globalization and 
the closely-related derivative idea of ‘social exclusion’ are constructed, Cameron and Palan devote 
a good deal of the book to the elaboration of three interacting ‘imagined economies’ that are the 
subjects of persistent acts of self-fulfilling narration in the context of globalization discourse: the 
‘offshore’, the ‘private’ and the ‘anti’ economies. One of the book’s fundamental claims is that the 
successful imagination of these economic spaces combines to challenge and ultimately unravel 
established intersubjectivities about social space and political possibilities that follow. Thus the 
image of ‘offshore’ – borderless, anarcho-capitalism populated by powerful stateless actors and 
processes – carries with it a coherent logical story about what should happen within the space still 
regulated by (national) public authority (an increasingly privatised economy overseen by a 
‘competition state’). It also helps to rationalise a story about the inevitability of a localized, 
residual, dependent and marginalized anti-economy, not least because the policy logic of the 
‘competition state’ forces/excuses an abdication of the state from redistributive responsibility. In 
their relatively downbeat conclusion, which nevertheless is testimony to the power of the processes 
they theorize, Cameron and Palan at least hint at the task facing a recast ‘globalization studies’: 
 
Globalization … relies for its meaning on an acceptance of an image of the world economy 
operating at different speeds. Since social exclusion is written into this imagery – since it is 
immanent to the narrative – it becomes difficult to articulate a plausible theory of poverty and 
poverty reduction without challenging the entire offshore and private economy matrix upon 
which the discourse of globalization is built (p. 160).      
 
Like Bauman, Cameron and Palan share a commitment to a radical epistemological politics. As 
should be clear, their book amounts to a full-frontal assault on the metatheoretical assumptions of 
the social scientific territory into which debates about globalization have been parachuted during 
the past decade. Their critique of this ‘orthodoxy’ uses ammunition from numerous fields that, at 
best, are likely to be found only in the peripheral vision of most scholars of IR and IPE. As they say 
explicitly (p.43), the intention is to break out of the ‘strait-jacket of globalization theory, by 
drawing on a synthesis of anthropology, historiography, cultural studies, literary criticism and 
psychoanalysis’. The book’s erudition is hugely impressive and its deployment and assimilation of 
insights from beyond the mainstream is utterly successful in both problematizing and shedding new 
 14
light upon much of the work conducted hitherto on globalization. It is probably fair to characterize 
the book as a return to the spirit of pre-disciplinary political economy where normative, political 
and analytical concerns appear to have been inseparable from analytical endeavour and where the 
migratory movement across the terrain of intellectual life was rather more straightforward than 
today.  
 
The nagging question is whether it will acquire the readership it so deserves. The book is most 
obviously addressed to the IPE community in that its depiction of globalization studies orthodoxy is 
that which deals with questions of state-market-authority dynamics in the context of alleged 
epochal transformations in the domain of the economy. While some voices in IPE cast the field as 
open and heterodox (RIPE Editors, 1994)  – and thus theoretically amenable to a work like The 
Imagined Economies of Globalization, other interventions might be read as attempts to formalize 
the scope of IPE and thereby define not only what it is, but also what it is not (Katzenstein, 
Keohane and Krasner, 1998). In a poignant echo of their own discussion of imagined economies, so 
the thrust of Cameron and Palan’s work places them in danger of becoming marginalized by the 
powerful (and still prevalent) narrative logic of disciplinary institutionalization (see Klein 2004).  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
There are numerous possible reactions to the question of what ‘globalization’ means for the 
organization of our knowledge production. Insofar as this issue is discussed, the dominant theme 
seems to reproduce the notion of globalization as an exogenous pressure that forces us (as 
academics) to contemplate the appropriate strategic consequences and whether we have the 
intellectual technologies necessary to engage in the conceptual capture of these processes 
(Appadurai, 1999; 2000). What have perhaps been missing hitherto are sustained engagements with 
the obverse question of what our modes of knowledge production mean for the reality of 
‘globalization’. That we have been collective complicit co-authors of the world we seek to objectify 
is a clear theme of two of the books discussed here, and all three take very seriously a commitment 
to academic enquiry as consisting of rather more than the quest to achieve detached, rationalistic 
and analytical precision. What divides them is disagreement about the degree to which established 
academic values are able to assist in the crossover from analysis to action, as Sørensen puts it (p. 
193). However we chose to conceptualise the linkage between globalization and its exclusionary 
consequences and if this ultimately bothers us, the task for academics must somehow become 
altogether more reflexive – about both research and pedagogical strategies – than presently 
ascendant epistemological norms tend to allow. If our practice is constitutive of the very world 
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from which we seek to achieve analytical distance, then it follows that our agency is rather more 
than we might suppose it to be. What might seem to prevent an exercise of agential muscle in the 
face of ‘globalization’ is the powerful institution of disciplinarity, which not only channels 
academic enquiry in the direction of certain types of investigation that might disallow certain types 
of reasoning about the world, but which also is locked into conceptions of time and space that turn 
acts of narrative reproduction into apparently ineluctable structural forces.    
 
What each of these books shows, in quite different ways it has to be said, is that globalization 
(whether as a theorized structural condition or as an irritating and obdurate empty signifier) does 
not require us to mount an overt interdisciplinary crusade in order to be engaged with. Bauman and 
Sørensen illustrate how much can be achieved with a degree of scholarly reflexivity within 
disciplinary formations. Meanwhile, one important lesson to be derived from reading Cameron and 
Palan’s work is that political economy is – for the most part, and in the UK especially – an open 
field in which path-breaking work can still be propagated. Disciplinarity has undoubtedly shaped 
the developing area of globalization studies in a negative sense, but interdisciplinarity will only 
make a difference if epistemological radical speaks to epistemological radical across the 
disciplinary divide. A conversation amongst epistemological conservatives will only reproduce the 
problems that these three books rail against so successfully.     
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Many thanks to Stuart Elden for his extensive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of 
this article.  
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